State Liability to Innocent Prisoners in Prison Uprisings by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 1 Article 10
Spring 3-1-1972
State Liability to Innocent Prisoners in Prison
Uprisings
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
State Liability to Innocent Prisoners in Prison Uprisings, 29 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 119 (1972),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol29/iss1/10
NOTES
STATE LIABILITY TO INNOCENT PRISONERS IN
PRISON UPRISINGS
The growing number of prison uprisings' emphasizes the question of
the extent to which a state may use force to quell mass prison revolts
without becoming liable for the injuries and deaths thus caused. Although
various individuals may be injured or killed in the course of restoring
order, the state's liability for injuries to and deaths of prisoners not inv-
olved in the uprising is of particular interest as there would appear to be
a more substantial likelihood of liability.
2
THE RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO SUE
Historically the concept denoting the extreme limitation of a prison-'
er's rights was encompassed by the phrase "civil death."'3 A felon sent-
enced for life was deemed legally dead; the commencement of his prison
term caused the convict's debts to be paid and his estate administered and
distributed.' Having lost all his civil rights and attained the legal status
of one naturally dead, he was incapable of bringing suit in his own name
in any court for any future action that may have arisen.5 Although many
'The following are the major disturbances in the wave of prison violence since 1968:
Attica State Prison, N.Y., Sept. 1971; San Quentin Prison, Cal., Aug. 1971; Florida State
Prison, Raiford, Feb. 1971; State Reformatory, Pendleton, Ind., Sept. 1969; Ohio State
Penitentiary, Aug. 1968; Raleigh Prison, N.C., Apr. 1968; Oregon State Penitentiary, May
1968. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 27, 1971 at 20; see NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 1971
at 38.
2Innocent prisoners are more likely to recover than ones who promoted or participated
in the uprising as they caused no wrong, had- no intent to disrupt or overthrow authority
and were injured merely by circumstance as innocent bystanders. Prison guards injured or
killed are often precluded from suing the state as they are covered by workmen's compensa-
tion. E.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW §§ 2, 3, II (McKinney 1965); N.Y. CORREc.
LAW § 472 (McKinney 1968). Even though the militia may be called upon to aid in the
suppression of the uprising, states have not been held liable for injuries sustained by their
militia while in active service. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159 (1963); Feres
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950).
3Civilly dead is the state of a person who, although possessing natural life, has lost all
his civil rights and as to them is considered dead. Quick v. Western Ry., 207 Ala. 376, 92
So. 608 (1922); Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888); Annot., 139 A.L.R.
1309 (1942); Comment, Civil Death in Alabama, 8 ALA. L. REv. 62 (1955).
'Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 131 Me. 228, 160 A. 777 (1932). The court
took the extreme position that the prisoner's contracts and relations to persons and things
are affected in all respects as if he were dead. Contra. Coffee v. Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57
P. 482 (1899). Here civil death was not equated with physical death as the prisoner could
own property and be a witness.
'Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 131 Me. 228, 160 A. 777 (1932); Quick v.
Western Ry., 207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 608 (1922); see Coffee v. Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57 P.
482 (1899).
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states have retained the idea of civil death for those serving a life sentence,6
the trend is away from the medieval concept of strict civil death as the
courts often liberally construe recent statutory exceptions. 7 Thus it is
generally no longer held that the prisoner forfeits his property or loses his
power to contract; what does remain of civil death, however, includes the
prevention of a prisoner from bringing an action in court.'
For those prisoners serving less than a life sentence, some states
provide merely for the suspension of civil rights while the prisoner remains
incarcerated.' After this disability is removed 10 the prisoner may assert his
rights by commencing an action for a cause that may have accrued during
his imprisonment." This suspended right to sue, however, may still be
subject to some limitations. New York, for example, will only allow
actions for accidental injuries as opposed to matters arising out of the
'E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-311 (1947);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 222.010 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4721 (Repl. Vol. 1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. c. 21, § 66 (1958); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-37 (1953).
'In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 658, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970). The court
noted that civil death has been replaced with statutory provisions so that civil rights are
limited only for legitimate penal objectives. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970) provides
in part for a prison bill of rights allowing the prisoner to inherit property, to correspond
confidentially with his attorney, to own written material produced during imprisonment and
to purchase, receive and read published writings. Civil death has been held not to denote
absolute legal extinction of the person. Grasso v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 264 Cal.
App. 2d 597, 70 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1968). Kansas has repealed its statutes on civil death. Act
of July 1, 1970, L. No. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-4701, repealing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-118
(1964). Courts have generally refused to invoke the doctrine of civil death absent clear
provisions providing for the extinction of civil rights. Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1311 (1942). See
Scott v. Scott, 192 Ga. 370, 15 S.E.2d 416 (1941); Federman v. State, 173 Misc. 830, 19
N.Y.S.2d 325 (Ct. CI. 1940).
'Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888); Lynch v. Quinlan, 65 Misc. 2d
236, 317 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Comment, Civil Death in Alabama, 8 ALA. L. REV.
62 (1955); Legislation, Civil Death Statutes-Medieval Fiction in a Modern World. 50
HARV. L. REV. 968 (1937).
9E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-310 (1947); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 222.010 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4720 (Repl. Vol. 1969); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. c. 21, § 65 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 137.240 (1969); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 23-48-35 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-
36 (1953).
"9The disability may be removed upon parole as well as on the completion of the
sentence. E.g.. Duffy v. State, 197 Misc. 569, 94 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Ct. Cl. 1950). Apparently,
a cause of action may not be brought at an earlier time by a prisoner's legal representative.
Hewson v. State, 27 App. Div. 2d 358, 279 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
"E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 5-230, 235 (1947); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2703
(Repl. Vol. 1964); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 208 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT
§ 10(5) (McKinney 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
12-36 (1953).
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prisoner's arrest or detention. 2 Whether injuries sustained during the
suppression of a prison revolt would be accidental and therefore suable
or a matter of detention and therefore nonsuable has apparently not been
decided. They may well be considered acts of detention as this category
appears to include those functions the state may perform in its sovereign
capacity."
The prisoner's right to sue may be inferred, however, from such stat-
utes as enacted by Arizona, Missouri and New York if the injuries sus-
tained were the result of unauthorized or overzealous acts of prison offi-
cials. 4 It seems that this right may be of little value, however, unless the
innocent prisoner was deliberately beaten without provocation or was
obviously injured by unauthorized methods. Both of these areas present
difficult proof problems because of the complexities and confusion inher-
ent in quelling prison riots. Consequently, with the only exception appar-
ently being Hawaii where prisoners do not forfeit their right to bring suit,
5
restrictions of some kind limit or hamper the prisoner's right to sue.
Although the constitutionality of statutes providing for the forfeiture
of various civil rights has not often been qustioned, 6 where it was, in
Quick v. Western Railway,1' the court said it appeared the legislature
might impose inability to sue as punishment for a crime. More recently,
in Harrell v. State,1 the statutory suspension of civil rights was held not
to deprive a prisoner of his rights under the fourteenth amendment. Al-
though the court did not indulge in even the slightest explanation, it may
well be that the mere suspension of civil rights poses few constitutional
problems where rights are not forfeited but merely delayed.
"N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 79, 79-a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1971); see, e.g., Broadus v.
State, 61 Misc. 2d 970, 307 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Ct. CI. 1970); Matthews v. State, 13 Misc. 2d
298, 178 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Ct. CI. 1957); Grant v. State, 192 Misc. 45, 77 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Ct.
Cl. 1948).
13See note 32 infra.
UARIZ. REV. ST.T. ANN. § 13-1653 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 222.020 (1962);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-c (McKinney Supp. 1971); cf MIss. CODE ANN. § 7916
(1957).
15HAWAII REV. LAWS § 716-3 (Supp. 1970).
'8Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1312-13 (1942).
'7207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 608 (1922). The court admitted the unpopularity of the doctrine
of civil death but noted that there was no forfeiture of estate or corruption of blood. Using
an historical analysis, the sections of the Alabama Constitution in question were said never
to have been intended for the benefit of persons civilly dead. The notion of the forfeiture of
civil rights-as punishment itself has declined, Comment, Civil Death in Alabama, 8 ALA.
L. REV. 62 (1955). See also State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63 N.W. 83 (1895), where a statute
was upheld which dissolved marriage upon the imposition of a life sentence; subsequent
reversal of the sentence was held not to prevent the dissolution.
17 Misc. 2d 950, 188 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
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LIABILITY OF THE STATE
Even when the prisoner becomes entitled to bring a legal action, other
problems arise since the state has traditionally been immune from all tort
liability, 9 although this immunity has been waived in varying degrees.
20
Ostensibly to effectuate such waivers some states have created claims
commissions or courts of claims to handle actions against the state, but
often have not provided specific guidelines, especially for tort actions, as
to the exact situations in which the state may be held liable.2' The Illinois
constitution, for example, forbids the state to be a defendant in either law
or equity; yet its courts of claims may disburse funds for the state's
wrongs using as a guideline the criteria that would have been employed
had the state been a defendant. 22 Notwithstanding the lack of specificity,
these courts of claims were held valid in the face of a fourteenth amend-
ment challenge to the effect that permitting tort actions against the state
to be brought only in courts of claims was an unjustifiable classification23
Other states have avoided this confusion by clearly providing that they
may be held generally liable, with the stated exception of torts committed
by their employees.24 This exception would therefore seem to preclude
actions for injuries suffered at the hands of prison guards during the
suppression of a prison riot.
"A summary of this policy included:
The immunity is said to rest upon public policy; the absurdity of a wrong
committed by an entire people; the idea that whatever the state does must
be lawful, which has replaced the king who can do no wrong; the very
dubious theory that an agent of the state is always outside of the scope of
his authority and employment when he commits any wrongful act; reluct-
ance to divert public funds to compensate for private injuries; and the
inconvenience and embarrassment which would descend upon the govern-
ment if it should be subject to such liability.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 at 975 (4th ed. 1971).
'To a greater or lesser extent all states have given consent to be sued or have granted
permission for particular individuals to maintain suit. Id. at 975, 984.
21E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 13-1402 (1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-142 (1969);
ILL. REV. STAT. c. 37, § 439.8 (Supp. 1970); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.070 et seq. (1969);
MICH. STAT..ANN. § 27A.6419 (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 (Supp. 1969); S.D.
CoNtP. LAWS ANN. § 21-32-1 (1969); 'VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 931 (1970).
2'lLL. CONST. art. 4, § 26; ILL. REV. STAT. c. 37, § 439.8 (Supp. 1970).
2Edelen v. Hogsett, 44 Ill. 2d 215, 254 N.E.2d 435 (1969). The court held the require-
ment of suitors to file claims against the State in one centrally located court "obviously
sought to provide for the expeditious centralized handling of the numerous claims against
the State" and therefore the classification of claimants resulting therefrom was not arbi-
trary, capricious or unreasonable. Id. at 439.
24E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3115
(Supp. 1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30-265 (1969).
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Still other states have recognized that "[t]he immunity which the State
enjoyed solely by reason of its status as a sovereign [has] been severely
criticized as unjust and ill adapted to the facts of modern life,"
' , and have
therefore waived substantially all immunity from liability.'
6 To determine
the extent of their liability, states having made such waivers place them-
selves on a par with individuals and corporations.2? However, in matters
in which no private citizen or corporation may engage, states often retain
their immunity from suit.2s More precisely, "the state would not be re-
sponsible for the tortious acts of its employees performed clearly as a
governmental function requiring the exercise of discretion or judgment of
a quasi-judicial nature." 29 Acts done or furnished for the general public
74Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 169 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 415 (1960); accord,
Willis v. Department of Conserv. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
aE.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 334 (Repl. Vol. 1960); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 662-2 (1968);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 25AA (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.74 (Supp. 1971); N.Y.
COURT OF CLAIMS ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.010 (Supp. 1970);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13 (Supp. 1971). The New York statute appears to be the most
far-reaching:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
assumes liability and conseents to have the same determined in accordance
with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court
against individuals or corporations, provided the complaint complies with
the limitations of this article. Nothing herein contained shall be construed
to affect, alter or repeal any provision of the workmen's compensation
law.
N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMs ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). Caution must be exercised, however,
to determine possible differences between these statutory provisions as enacted and their
interpretation by local courts. Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363, 1407-09 (1954).
2E.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS § 662-2 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 25A.4 (Supp. 1971);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (1967); N.Y. COURT OF CLAImIs ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-12-02 (1960); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-3 1-I (Supp. 1970). See Beale v. State, - Misc. _ , 46 N.Y.S.2d
824 (Ct. Cl. 1944). The court held the measure of the state's duty to inmates working in its
institutional shops to be determined by the same standard of care imposed by the legislature
upon its citizens employed by industry even though such standards may be higher than the
situation would otherwise demand.
2Reid & Sibell, Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 60, 285 P.2d 364
(1955); Granger v. State, 14 App. Div. 2d 645, 218 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Newia-
dony v. State, 276 App. Div. 59,93 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Terrace Hotel Co. v. State,
46 Misc. 2d 174, 259 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ct. Cl. 1965), affd, 26 App. Div. 2d 23, 270 N.Y.S.2d
460 (Sup. Ct. 1966); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 at 979 (4th ed. 1971).
"Gross v. State, 33 App. Div. 2d 868, 306 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (Sup. Ct. 1969). In addition
the court mentioned that the state would have the same liability as an individual or corpora-
tion if the activity involved ministerial or nondiscretionary acts. Id. See Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Smith v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. at 2132 (E.D. Mich. 1971);
Brown v. City of Fairhope, 265 Ala. 596,93 So. 2d 419 (1957).
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good which usually produce no pecuniary profit or do not compete with
private enterprise are considered governmental functions. 0
It would appear that the operation of a state prison and actions re-
quired to control discipline therein would be governmental functions, as
the fundamental reason and purpose of such institutions have no counter-
part in private enterprise. The operation of a jail by either a county or a
municipality has been considered a governmental function and therefore
immune from suit.3 ' Furthermore, matters requiring suppression of prison
disturbances are clearly discretionary because of the variable fact situa-
tions involved. Based upon this rationale, one court has stated that the
suppression of insurrections and the breaking up of riots are governmental
functions, although in so deciding it was not specifically addressing the
issue of prison revolts.3 2 Thus, as the quelling of prison riots may be
characterized as governmental functions, it would seem that even states
which have agreed to be sued in tort actions may argue successfully that
the suppression of prison riots is still within the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Such a conclusion necessitates a brief comment on the current status
of this much-criticized doctrine.3 One new approach is that a state whose
constitution 34 permits the legislature to decide when and how the state is
3'Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d 463 (1955); see Town of Stockbridge
v. State Hwy. Bd., 125 Vt. 366, 216 A.2d 44 (1965). The court acknowledged that distinc-
tions between governmental functions and proprietary operations are not clearly defined as
there is not estalished rule; the reason for the distinctions is to avoid injustices which might
result based on the governmental character of organizations.
3'Grove v. County of San Joaquin, 156 Cal. App. 2d 808, 320 P.2d 161 (1958). But cf.
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957), where the court claimed that
the city was held liable in the exercise of its governmental function because of the special
duty it owed to the prisoner which was different from the duty owed to the general public.
A widow was allowed to recover, therefore, for the wrongful death of her husband who died
of smoke suffocation while left unattended and locked in jail.
32Newiadony v. State, 276 App. Div. 59, 93 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1949). The court
decided that there was no responsibility for the acts of a sovereign in war, or the suppression
of public disorders, or for the creation and development of the necessary instrumentalities
of force to implement these functions. See Smith v. Cooper, 475 P.2d 78 (Ore. 1970), where
it was indicated that the decisive reason why governmental functions should not be reviewed
by a court or jury is precisely because such acts and decisions can cover the whole spectrum
of governmental decisions such as the availability of funds, public acceptance, order of
priority, etc.
"W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 at 984 (4th ed. 197 1); see note 25 supra.
3E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art IV, Pt. 2, § 18; CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 6; FLA. CONST. art.
X, § 13; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 24; Ky. CONST. § 231; LA. CONST. art. II, § 35; MICH.
CONST. art. IX, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 22; NEv. CONST. art. IV, § 22; N.D. CONST.
art. t, § 22; OHIO CO ST. art. I, § 16; ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 24; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11;
S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. Ill, § 27; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17; WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 26; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 27; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8.
NOTES
to be held liable has thereby waived its governmental immunity and is-
subject to tort actions generally. This would seem to indicate a change
from the theory that immunity is granted to the state unless consent to
be sued is given36 to a theory that immunity must be affirmatively as-
serted.
Recently an Ohio court in Krause v. State,3 7 a case arising out of the
highly controversial Kent State shootings, took a bolder approach and
held sovereign immunity unconstitutional based upon the view that the
doctrine establishes two categories of claimants without having a founda-
tion in reasonableness.38 The court indicated that although the idea of
governmental immunity is to protect the state, in actuality it only protects
the wrongful acts of men, and further that if this allows the government
to irresponsibly kill or maim with impunity the most elemental notions
of due process of law would be violated.3 9 The court concluded by observ-
ing that as compensation is paid for the taking of property the state should
also compensate for the taking of life. 0 Although Krause has not yet run
its course in the appellate process, it may well indicate a trend toward the
final dissolution of governmental immunity.
OBTAINING JUDICIAL ACTION
If the prisoner has a right to sue and if the state may be held liable, it
then becomes important to examine the probable action courts will take
in cases which arise out of prison uprisings. To provide guidance for the
determination of the alleged injustice, it would seem that the courts would
Tirst turn to the statutory powers granted prison officials to compare acts
performed with acts permitted. It appears to be axiomatic that the state
has not only a right but a duty4 to use all suitable means to enforce and
maintain discipline in state prisons." To implement this duty, prison
5State v. Williams, 12 Ariz. App. 498,472 P.2d 109 (1970).
2Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609 (1960); Lewis v. State, 96 N.Y. 71 (1884).
mKrause v. State, No. 30880 (Ct. App. Ohio, Sept. 30, 1971).
311d. at 2. The two categories mentioned by the court were those offended by state action
and those offended by private action.
31Id. at 7.
4"Id. at 14, citing Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 176, 126 N.E. 72, 78
(1919). Although the court quotes dicta from Fowler, that case had been overruled. Aldrich
v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
"1Martin v. Gathright, 279 F. Supp. 485 (W.D. Va. 1967).
42E.g., N.Y. CORREc. LAw § 137(5) (McKinney Supp. 1971); United States v. Pennsy-
lvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965). The court claimed that discipline is indispensible to
the orderly operation of a state penal institution and certain rights must be curtailed to
achieve it. See Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), where it was
held that security has been and should be a paramount objective in maximum security
prisons.
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officials have been granted wide discretion4 3 and many states have made
it a felony for prisoners to instigate riots4" or take hostages." This deter-
mination may grant additional powers to prison officials in situations
where the riots are part of a convict's effort to escape confinement because
it might then be argued that deadly force could be used if that reasonably
seemed the only means to frustrate the escape efforts. Contrasted with
these granted and implied powers is the common law duty of a custodian
to take proper care of his prisoner."
Possibly because of this wide range of available powers, courts have
been reluctant to interfere with the management and control of discipli-
nary problems. An additional reason is that the correctional institutions
are deemed to be under the control of the executive branch of govern-
ment." One court expressed its hesitancy by stating that
[a] long series of violent prison riots [has] taught the courts that
we should be hesitant in injecting hampering restrictions upon
those who are charged with maintaining order in what is often an
explosive situation. 9
4-Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548
(4th Cir. 1963); Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1971). The traditional view of
an official's discretion is demonstrated by one court where it stated that
[tihe acts described seem to be authorized by statute, if, in the opinion of
the warden, it was deemed necessary in order to produce entire submission
or obedience of the convict.
Wightman v. Brush, 56 Hun. 647, 10 N.Y.S. 76 (1890).
"E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.45 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-724 (Supp.
1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94.020 (1957).
15E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4503 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.44 (Supp. 1971);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-743 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4723.1 (Supp. 1971); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94.030 (1957).
'6 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 10, § 3 (1969).
"7Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash.
318, 170 P. 1023 (1918); see Westbrook v. State, 133 Ga. 578, 66 S.E. 788 (1909), where it
was indicated by the court that the security of the prisoner remains his right, except as
expressly provided by statute, and if it be unlawfully invaded, he may resist such unlawful
invasion as if there had been no conviction.
'SDouglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548
(4th Cir. 1963).
"9Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9, 12 (W.D. Pa. 1971). Further, it has been said that
inmates should realize that the courts will not interfere with the conduct, management, and
disciplinary control of penal and correction institutions except in extreme cases. Douglas v.
Sigler, 386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967). One extreme of this attitude was expressed by the court
in Queen v. South Carolina Dep't of Correc.:
It is doubtful that the goals of modern penology will be saved in a prison
where the administration is handcuffed by judicial controls, and the prison-
ers . . . run the institution.
307 F. Supp. 841, 845 (D.S.C. 1970).
NOTES
This policy is based on the fear that judicial scrutiny would undermine
the authority and effectiveness of prison officials, 50 and is especially valid
if the disciplinary action involves only routine security measures. 5' The
crux of the argument is that the severity of incidents requiring immediate
and affirmative action should not be compounded because of delay or
unwillingness resulting from fear of judicial reprimand.
From the state's point of view the court's hesitancy to condemn acts
of prison officials would seem inherently sound and in keeping with old
doctrines of sovereign immunity and the limitations of a prisoner's right
to sue. To the prisoner, however, it presents another obstacle of public
policy counter to his interests. To obtain favorable action the prisoner at
least must demonstrate that a strong violation of the custodian's common
law duty occurred or that the incident in question was far beyond the
scope of routine security measures.
CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION
To avoid the problems and questions raised by state statutes and their
court interpretations, the prisoner might seek his remedy through asser-
tion of constitutional rights. Even though he may have no state cause of
action, a prisoner is still protected by due process and equal protection
guarantees.5 2 The very judgment and sentence of a life term or less by the
court confirms that the prisoner at least has a right to life53 and thus to
protection of his fundamental constitutional rights. 4 The court's task in
this area is one of diligently searching for the distinctions between acts
showing an arbitrary and capricious disregard of human rights and mere
matters of discipline immune from federal interference.55
5Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1971).
5'Queen v. South Carolina Dep't of Correc., 307 F. Supp. 841 (D.S.C. 1970); cf. State
v. Boles, 5 Conn. Cir. 22, 240 A.2d 920, 922 (1967). The court in Boles admitted it would
make every effort to uphold the validity of acts that would empower the mayor to impose a
curfew as a means to help suppress riots.
5 Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968);
Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp.
901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); United States
ex rel. Verde v. Case, 326 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
OBreed v. Atlanta, B. & C. R., 241 Ala. 640, 4 So. 2d 315 (1941).
5'Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (Ist Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968); Hester v. Craven, 322 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see United States
exrel. Shuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
OUnited States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7, 12 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
The court described this task as treading about in the "twilight zone" that separates interfer-
ence with a state's autonomy in policing its own penal system from the enforcement of
federally guaranteed rights. Id. See Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1971), where
the court noted the conflict between constitutional rights and the need for the state to
preserve order and prevent prison riots.
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Although prisoners are accorded the same protection of constitutional
rights as are other individuals, the distinction between free citizens and
those imprisoned must not be obscured.56 Challenge to the established
order is more easily accommodated in free society than in prisons where
rehabilitation is governed by rules.5 7 Within the prisons as well as in free
society a "clear and present danger''s may justify curtailment of constitu-
tional guarantees. The question then becomes whether the danger created
in a prison uprising justifies the force used in its suppression. The answer
may depend on the extent to which the force was disproportionate to the
danger 5 and whether the force offends general standards of humanity and
decency."'
Under proper circumstances a prisoner has a right to sue under the
eighth amendment of the United States Constitution.6 Although for
many years the prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment was not held
"In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970). The court in
Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), affd mem., 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir.
1970) stated that
a prison is not a private dwelling and a cell row is not a public highway.
Thus plaintiffs' freedoms and rights must be analyzed in the realistic
context of the prison situation where plaintiffs desire to exercise them.
Id. at 1047.
nld.; see Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 430 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 877 (1967).
'homas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919); United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954); Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp.
9 (W.D. Pa. 1971). In Wilson. the jury was told that a clear and present danger of interfer-
ence with prison discipline must exist before the prison regulations on the right to receive
literature would be considered reasonable. The court in Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis stated:
The state's power to impinge upon his constitutional rights is not without
limitation. Only a compelling state interest centering about prison security,
or a clear and present danger of a breach of prison discipline, or some
substantial interference with orderly institutional administration can jus-
tify curtailment of a prisoner's constitutional rights.
319 F. Supp. 901,904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"See generally Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), where the Court indicated that
evn though the governmental purpose may be legitimate and substantial, it cannot be pur-
sued by means that broadly stifle personal liberties if the result can be more narrowly
achieved. It has been said that punishment should be graduated and proportioned to the
offense. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The court in Jackson v. Godwin,
400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968), noted that to determine violations of constitutional rights the
disproportion between the punishment and the crime is a factor to be considered.
6Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Lollis v. New York State Dep't of
Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183,
193 (5th Cir. 1971).
61The right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment may also be enforced under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1965). Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp.
674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
NOTES
applicable to the states,62 in 19 10 the Supreme Court in Weems v. United
States indicated that a state sentence could be cruel and unusual within
the meaning of the eighth amendment.6 3 Having made no precise distinc-
tions between cruelty and unusualness, and seemingly not relying heavily
on definitions of these terms,64 the courts simply maintain that a factual
showing of cruel and unusual punishment would be necessary to support
judicial interference.
5
Punishment which does not exceed the limits fixed by statute will
probably not be considered cruel or unusual.66 Techniques, however,
which are outside the bounds of traditional penalties would be constitu-
tionally suspect.6 7 When discipline is authorized by statute the question is
whether the force used to suppress a prison revolt is within the ambit of
traditional controls. One court stated that "it is clearly accepted that the
[eighth] amendment prohibits certain hard core inhuman treatment."65
This would include something intolerable to fundamental fairness, shock-
ing to the general conscience" and raising up the "cry of horror" against
62O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). The dissenting opinion, however, forecasted
the trend of applying the eighth amendment provision to the states. Id. at 370.
6Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The case involved the Philippine Penal
Code which was held to inflict cruel and unusual punishment by the provisions under which
the falsification by a public official of a public document was punished by hard labor for
twelve to twenty years and during his imprisonment the prisoner was forced to carry a chain
which extended from his wrist to his ankle. See also Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968), where it was stated that there is no meaningful distinction drawn between
punishment by statutory sentence and punishment for disciplinary purposes. The court also
indicated that the eighth amendment was directly applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.
6 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786,
792 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
OJackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968); Glenn v. Ciccone, 370 F.2d 361,
363 (8th Cir. 1966); see Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1965).
OGState v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 174 S.E.2d 793, 805 (1970); State v. Elliott, 269 N.C.
683, 153 S.E.2d 330 (1967); State v. Stewart, 4 N.C. App. 249 166 S.E.2d 458 (1969).
"Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Court indicated that traditional penalties
might include fines, imprisonment, and even execution depending on the enormity of the
crime. Id. at 100.
"'Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 191 (5th Cir. 197 1). The court further stated that
[t]he cruel and unusual punishment clause is a nonstatic, moral precept
designed to curb treatment which offends contemporary standards of de-
cency.
Id. at 190. The court implied that it is time for a change of attitude for "[w]e deal with
human beings, not dumb, driven cattle." Id. at 193. See Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp.
786,791 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
"In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890); Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483 (8th Cir.
1965).
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man's inhumanity to his fellow man.70 Extreme maltreatment, the wanton
infliction of pain and punishments of torture7' are matters beyond the
protected scope of allowable disciplinary action and proper prison admin-
istration.7
2
Although specific acts have been characterized as cruel or unusual,
especially when the convict was singled out for such treatment, the situa-
tion of a prison uprising by its very nature involves more than the particu-
lar injured prisoner. Besides the actual amount of force employed and the
injuries of individual prisoners, it would seem that the courts would be
compelled to look at the entire insurrection to determine dangers involved
to all the prisoners, hostages, townspeople and guards. The concept of
human decency cannot be "defined in terms of approval or reproach
uninfluenced by the subjective emotions and impulses of those who are
required to apply it in the characterization of human conduct. ' 73 It may
not be undesirable that for the protection of many a few must suffer.
Moreover, because accidents andmistakes occur even with proper caution,
the court may not be able to say that there is clear abuse of discretion or
disproportionate use of force. It seems, therefore, that the necessity for
delicately balancing variable fact and policy considerations precludes the
clear deduction that wounding and killing innocent prisoners is a violation
of constitutional rights. This, however, does not diminish the validity of
the argument that a highly disproportionate amount of force, creating
extremes which offend general standards of human decency, is beyond the
scope of reasonable disciplinary controls sanctioned by the state.
The difficulties encountered by prisoners in their attempts to sue,
7 Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (concurring opinion); see
O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal. App. 2d 449, 109 P.2d 8 (1941), where the court made the
distinction between the use of corporal punishment to suppress a threatened riot and the
deliberate infliction of corporate punishment for past offenses. Id. at 16.
71Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968).
7 Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970); Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483
(8th Cir. 1965). The following are specific examples where courts found cruel and unusual
punishment: Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1970) (unsanitary facilities on
death row); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (use of the strap); Wright v.
McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (certain conditions in the use of a strip cell);
Roberts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (unprovoked, grossly negligent
shooting of a minor prisoner convicted of petty larceny). Examples where the court did not
find cruel and unusual punishment are, Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969) (placement in maximum security confinement); Heft v. Parker,
258 F. Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1966) (inadequate diet); Rudolph v. State, 275 Ala. 115, 152
So. 2d 662, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), cert. and stay of execution denied, 377 U.S.
919 (1964) (death penalty for rape).
71Hall v. State, 176 Md. 488, 5 A.2d 916, 918 (1939); see Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d
183, 191 (5th Cir. 1971); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
